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I. 
One of the central tasks of the moral philosopher is to articulate the 
convictions of the society in which he or she lives so that these 
convictions may become available for rational scrutiny. This task is all 
the more urgent when a variety of conflicting and incompatible beliefs 
are held within one and the same community, either by rival groups who 
differ on key moral questions or by one and the same set of individuals 
who find within themselves competing moral allegiances. In either of 
these types of case the first task of the moral philosopher is to render 
explicit what is at issue in the various disagreements and it is a task of 
this kind that I have set myself in this lecture. 
For it is quite clear that there are large disagreements about 
patriotism in our society. And although it would be a mistake to suppose 
that there are only two clear, simple and mutually opposed sets of beliefs 
about patriotism, it is at least plausible to suggest that the range of 
conflicting views can be placed on a spectrum with two poles. At one end 
is the view, taken for granted by almost everyone in the nineteenth 
century, a commonplace in the literary culture of the McGuffey readers, 
that 'patriotism' names a virtue. At the other end is the contrasting 
view, expressed with sometimes shocking clarity in the nineteen sixties, 
that 'patriotism' names a vice. It would be misleading for me to suggest 
that I am going to be able to offer good reasons for taking one of these 
views rather than the other. What I do hope to achieve is a clarification 
of the issues that divide them. 
A necessary first step in the direction of any such clarification is to 
distinguish patriotism properly so-called from two other sets of attitudes 
that are all too easily assimilated to it. The first is that exhibited by those 
who are protagonists of their own nation's causes because and only 
because, so they assert, it is their nation which is the champion of some 
great moral ideal. In the Great War of 1914-18 Max Weber claimed that 
Imperial Germany should be supported because its was the cause of 
Kultur, while Emile Durkheim claimed with equal vehemence that 
France should be supported because its was the cause of civilisation. And 
here and now there are those American politicians who claim that the 
United States deserves our allegiance because it champions the goods of 
freedom against the evils of communism. What distinguishes their 
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attitude from patriotism is twofold: first it is the ideal and not the nation 
which is the primary object of their regard; and secondly insofar as their 
regard for the ideal provides good reasons for allegiance to their country, 
it provides good reasons for anyone at all to uphold their country's 
cause, irrespective of their nationality or citizenship. 
Patriotism by contrast is defined in terms of a kind of loyalty to a 
particular nation which only those possessing that particular nationality 
can exhibit. Only Frenchmen can be patriotic about France, while 
anyone can make the cause of civilisation their own. But it would be all 
too easy in noticing this to fail to make a second equally important 
distinction. Patriotism is not to be confused with a mindless loyalty to 
one's own particular nation which has no regard at all for the 
characteristics of that particular nation. Patriotism does generally and 
characteristically involve a peculiar regard not just for one's own nation, 
but for the particular characteristics and merits and achievements of 
one's own nation. These latter are indeed valued as merits and 
achievements and their character as merits and achievements provides 
reasons supportive of the patriot's attitudes. But the patriot does not 
value in the same way precisely similar merits and achievements when 
they are the merits and achievements 'of some nation other than his or 
hers. For he or she-at least in the role of patriot-values them not just 
as merits and achievements, but as the merits and achievements of this 
particular nation. 
To say this is to draw attention to the fact that patriotism is one of a 
class of loyalty-exhibiting virtues (that is, if it is a virtue at all), other 
mem hers of which are marital fidelity, the love of one's own family and 
kin, friendship, and loyalty to such institutions as schools and cricket or 
baseball clubs. All these attitudes exhibit a peculiar action-generating 
regard for particular persons, institutions or groups, a regard founded 
upon a particular historical relationship of association between the 
person exhibiting the regard and the relevant person, institution or 
group. It is often, although not always, the case that associated with this 
regard will be a felt gratitude for the benefits which the individual takes 
him or herself to have received from the person, institution or group. 
But it would be one more mistake to suppose patriotism or other such 
attitudes ofloyalty to be at their core or primarily responses of gratitude. 
For there are many persons, institutions and groups to which each of us 
have good reason to feel grateful without this kind of loyalty being 
involved. What patriotism and other such attitudes involve is not just 
gratitude, but a particular kind of gratitude; and what those who treat 
patriotism and other such loyalties as virtues are committed to believing 
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is not that what they owe their nation or whomever or whatever it is is 
simply a requital for benefits received, based on some relationship of 
reciprocity of benefits. 
So although one may as a patriot love one's country, or as a husband 
or wife exhibit marital fidelity, and cite as partially supporting reasons 
one's country's or one's spouse's merits and one's own gratitude to 
them for benefits received these can be no more than partially supporting 
reasons, just because what is valued is valued precisely as the merits of 
my country or spouse or as the benefits received by me from my country 
or spouse. The particularity of the relationship is essential and inelimi-
nable, and in identifying it as such we have already specified one central 
problem. What is the relationship between patriotism as such, the 
regard for this particular nation, and the regard which the patriot has for 
the merits and achievements of his or her nation and for the benefits 
which he or she has received? The answer to this question must be 
delayed for it will turn out to depend upon the answer to an apparently 
even more fundamental question, one that can best be framed in terms 
of the thesis that, if patriotism is understood as I have understood it, 
then 'patriotism' is not merely not the name of a virtue, but must be the 
name of a vice, since patriotism thus understood and morality are 
incompatible. 
II. 
The presupposition of this thesis is an account of morality which has 
enjoyed high prestige in our culture. According to that account to judge 
from a moral standpoint is to judge impersonally. It is to judge as any 
rational person would judge, independently of his or her interests, 
affections and social position. And to act morally is to act in accordance 
with such impersonal judgments. Thus to think and to act morally 
involve the moral agent in abstracting him or herself from all social 
particularity and partiality. The potential conflict between morality so 
understood and patriotism is at once clear. For patriotism requires me to 
exhibit peculiar devotion to my nation and you to yours. It requires me 
to regard such contingent social facts as where I was born and what 
government ruled over that place at that time, who my parents were, 
who my great-great-grandparents were and so on, as deciding for me the 
question of what virtuous action is-at least insofar as it is the virtue of 
patriotism which is in question. Hence the moral standpoint and the 
patriotic standpoint are systematically incompatible. 
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·. 
Yet although this is so, it might be argued that the two standpoints 
need not be in conflict. For patriotism and all other such particular 
loyalties can be restricted in their scope so that their exercise is always 
within the confines imposed by morality. Patriotism need be regarded as 
nothing more than a perfectly proper devotion to one's own nation 
which must never be allowed to violate the constraints set by the 
impersonal moral standpoint. This is indeed the kind of patriotism 
professed by certain liberal moralists who are often indignant when it is 
suggested by their critics that they are not patriotic. To those critics 
however patriotism thus limited in its scope appears to be emasculated, 
and it does so because in some of the most important situations of actual 
social life either the patriotic standpoint comes into serious conflict with 
the standpoint of a genuinely impersonal morality or it amounts to no 
more than a set of practically empty slogans. What kinds of circum-
stances are these? They are at least twofold. 
The first kind arises from scarcity of essential resources, often 
historically from the scarcity ofland suitable for cultivation and pasture, 
and perhaps in our own time from that of fossil fuels. What your 
community requires as the material prerequisites for your survival as a 
distinctive community and your growth into a distinctive nation may be 
exclusive use of the same or some of the same natural resources as my 
community requires for its survival and growth into a distinctive nation. 
When such a conflict arises, the standpoint of impersonal morality 
requires an allocation of goods such that each individual person counts 
for one and no more than one, while the patriotic standpoint requires 
that I strive to further the interests of my community and you strive to 
further those of yours, and certainly where the survival of one commu-
nity is at stake, and sometimes perhaps even when only large interests of 
one community are at stake, patriotism entails a willingness to go to war 
on one's community's behalf. 
The second type of confiict-engendering circumstance arises from 
differences between communities about the right way for each to live. 
Not only competition for scarce natural resources, but incompatibilities 
arising from such conflict-engendering beliefs may lead to situations in 
which once again the liberal moral standpoint and the patriotic stand-
point arc radically at odds. The administration of the pax Romatlll from 
time to time required the Roman imperium to set its frontiers at the point 
at which they could be most easily secured, so that the burden of 
supporting the legions would be reconcilable with the administration of 
Roman law. And the British empire was no different in its time. But this 
required infringing upon the territory and the independence of barbar-
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ian border peoples. A variety of such peoples-Scottish Gaels, Iroquois 
Indians, Bedouin-have regarded raiding the territory of their tradi-
tional enemies living within the confines of such large empires as an 
essential constituent of the good life; whereas the settled urban or 
agricultural communities which provided the target for their depreda-
tions have regarded the subjugation of such peoples and their reeduca-
tion into peaceful pursuits as one of their central responsibilities. And on 
such issues once again the impersonal moral standpoint and that of 
patriotism cannot be reconciled. 
For the impersonal moral standpoint, understood as the philosophi-
cal protagonists of modern liberalism have understood it, requires 
neutrality not only between rival and competing interests, but also 
between rival and competing sets of beliefs about the best way for human 
beings to live. Each individual is to be left free to pursue in his or her 
own way that way oflife which he or she judges to be best; while morality 
by contrast consists of rules which, just because they are such that any 
rational person, independently of his or her interests or point of view on 
the best way for human beings to live, would assent to them, are equally 
binding on all persons. Hence in conflicts between nations or other 
communities over ways oflife, the standpoint of morality will once again 
be that of an impersonal arbiter, adjudicating in ways that give equal 
weight to each individual person's needs, desires, beliefs about the good 
and the like, while the patriot is once again required to be partisan. 
Notice that in speaking of the standpoint of liberal impersonal 
morality in the way in which I have done I have been describing a 
standpoint whose truth is both presupposed by the political actions and 
utterances of a great many people in our society and explicitly articu-
lated and defended by most modern moral philosophers; and that it has 
at the level of moral philosophy a number of distinct versions-some 
with a Kantian flavour, some utilitarian, some contractarian. I do not 
mean to suggest that the disagreements between these positions arc 
unimportant. Nonetheless the five central positions that I have ascribed 
to that standpoint appear in all these various philosophical guises: first, 
that morality is constituted by rules to which any rational person would 
under certain ideal conditions give assent; secondly, that those rules 
impose constraints upon and arc neutral between rival and competing 
interests-morality itself is not the expression of any particular interest; 
thirdly, that those rules are also neutral between rival and competing 
sets of beliefs about what the best way for human beings to live is; 
fourthly, that the units which provide the subject-matter of morality as 
well as its agents are individual human beings and that in moral 
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evaluations each individual is to count for one and nobody for more than 
one; and fifthly, that the standpoint of the moral agent constituted by 
allegiance to these rules is one and the same for all moral agents and as 
such is independent of all social particularity. What morality provides 
are standards by which all actual social structures may be brought to 
judgment from a standpoint independent of all of them. It is morality so 
understood allegiance to which is not only incompatible with treating 
patriotism as a virtue, but which requires that patriotism-at least in 
any substantial version-be treated as a vice. 
But is this the only possible way to understand morality? As a matter 
of history, the answer is clearly 'No'. This understanding of morality 
invaded post Renascence Western culture at a particular point in time as 
the moral counterpart to political liberalism and social individualism 
and its polemical stances reflect its history of emergence from the 
conflicts which those movements engendered and themselves presup-
pose alternatives against which those polemical stances were and are 
directed. Let me therefore turn to considering one of those alternative 
accounts of morality, whose peculiar interest lies in the place that it has 
to assign to patriotism. 
III. 
According to the liberal account of morality where and from whom I 
learn the principles and precepts of morality are and must be irrelevant 
both to the question of what the content of morality is and to that of the 
nature of my commitment to it, as irrelevant as where and from whom I 
learn the principles and precepts of mathematics are to the content of 
mathematics and the nature of my commitment to mathematical truths. 
By contrast on the alternative account of morality which I am going to 
sketch, the questions of where and from whom I learn my morality turn out 
to be crucial for both the content and the nature of moral commitment. 
On this view it is an essential characteristic of the morality which 
each of us acquires that it is learned from, in and through the way oflife 
of some particular community. Of course the moral rules elaborated in 
one particular historical community will often resemble and sometimes 
be identical with the rules to which allegiance is given in other particular 
communities, especially in communities with a shared history or which 
appeal to the same canonical te~:ts. But there will characteristically be 
some distinctive features of the set of rules considered as a whole, and 
those distinctive features will often arise from the way in which members 
of that particular community responded to some earlier situation or 
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series of situations in which particular features of difficult cases led to 
one or more rules being put in question and reformulated or understood 
in some new way. Moreover the form of the rules of morality as taught 
and apprehended will be intimately connected with specific institutional 
arrangements. The moralities of different societies may agree in having 
a precept enjoining that a child should honor his or her parents, but 
what it is so to honor and indeed what a father is and what a mother is 
will vary greatly between different social orders. So that what I learn as a 
guide to my actions and as a standard for evaluating them is never 
morality as such, but always the highly specific morality of some highly 
specific social order. 
To this the reply by the protagonists of modern liberal morality 
might well be: doubtless this is how a comprehension of the rules of 
morality is first acquired. But what allows such specific rules, framed in 
terms of particular social institutions, to be accounted moral rules at all 
is the fact they are nothing other than applications of universal and 
general moral rules and individuals acquire genuine morality only 
because and insofar as they progress from particularised socially specific 
applications of universal and general moral rules to comprehending 
them as universal and general. To learn to understand oneself as a moral 
agent just is to learn to free oneself from social particularity and to adopt 
a standpoint independent of any particular set of social institutions and 
the fact that everyone or almost everyone has to learn to do this by 
starting out from a standpoint deeply infected by social particularity and 
partiality goes no way towards providing an alternative account of 
morality. But to this reply a threefold rejoinder can be made. 
First, it is not just that I first apprehend the rules of morality in some 
socially specific and particularised form. It is also and correlatively that 
the goods by reference to which and for the sake of which any set of rules 
must be justified are also going to be goods that are socially specific and 
particular. For central to those goods is the enjoyment of one particular 
kind of social life, lived out through a particular set of social relation-
ships and thus what I enjoy is the good of this particular social life 
inhabited by me and I enjoy it as what it is. It may well be that it follows 
that I would enjoy and benefit equally from similar forms of social life in 
other communities; but this hypothetical truth in no way diminishes the 
importance of the contention that my goods are as a matter of fact found 
lure, among these particular people, in these particular relationships. 
Goods are never encountered except as thus particularised. Hence the 
abstract general claim, that rules of a certain kind arc justified by being 
productive of and constitutive of goods of a certain kind, is true only if 
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these and these and these particular sets of rules incarnated in the 
practices of these and these and these particular communities are 
productive of or constitutive of these and these and these particular 
goods enjoyed at certain particular times and places by certain specifia-
ble individuals. 
It follows that I find my justification for allegiance to these rules of 
morality in my particular community; deprived of the life of that 
community, I would have no reason to be moral. But this is not all. To 
obey the rules of morality is characteristically and generally a hard task 
for human beings. Indeed were it not so, our need for morality would 
not be what it is. It is because we are continually liable to be blinded by 
immediate desire, to be distracted from our responsibilities, to lapse into 
backsliding and because even the best of us may at times encounter quite 
unusual temptations that it is important to morality that I can only be a 
moral agent because we are moral agents, that I need those around me to 
reinforce my moral strengths and assist in remedying my moral 
weaknesses. It is in general only within a community that individuals 
become capable of morality, are sustained in their morality and are 
constituted as moral agents by the way in which other people regard 
them and what is owed to and by them as well as by the way in which 
they regard themselves. In requiring much from me morally the other 
members of my community express a kind of respect for me that has 
nothing to do with expectations of benefit; and those of whom nothing or 
litde is required in respect of morality are treated with a lack of respect 
which is, if repeated often enough, damaging to the moral capacities of 
those individuals. Of course, lonely moral heroism is sometimes re-
quired and sometimes achieved. But we must not treat this exceptional 
type of case as though it were typical. And once we recognize that 
typically moral agency and continuing moral capacity are engendered 
and sustained in essential ways by particular institutionalised social ties 
in particular social groups, it will be difficult to counterpose allegiance to 
a particular society and allegiance to morality in the way in which the 
protagonists of liberal morality do. 
Indeed the case for treating patriotism as a virtue is now clear. If first 
of all it is the case that I can only apprehend the rules of morality in the 
version in which they are incarnated in some specific community; and if 
secondly it is the case that the justification of morality must be in terms 
of particular goods enjoyed within the life of particular communities; 
and if thirdly it is the case that I am characteristically brought into being 
and maintained as a moral agent only through the particular kinds of 
moral sustenance afforded by my community, then it is clear that 
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deprived of this community, I am unlikely to flourish as a moral agent. 
Hence my allegiance to the community and what it requires of me-
even to the point of requiring me to die to sustain its life-could not 
meaningfully be contrasted with or counterposed to what morality 
required of me. Detached from my community, I will be apt to lose my 
hold upon all genuine standards of judgment. Loyalty to that commu-
nity, to the hierarchy of particular kinship, particular local community 
and particular natural community, is on this view a prerequisite for 
morality. So patriotism and those loyalties cognate to it are not just 
virtues but central virtues. Everything however turns on the truth or 
falsity of the claims advanced in the three preceding if-clauses. And the 
argument so far affords us no resources for delivering a verdict upon that 
truth or falsity. Nonetheless some progress has been achieved, and not 
only because the terms of the debate have become clearer. For it has also 
become clear that this dispute is not adequately characterised if it is 
understood simply as a disagreement between two rival accounts of 
morality, as if there were some independently identifiable phenomenon 
situated somehow or other in the social world waiting to be described 
more or less accurately by the contending parties. What we have here 
are two rival and incompatible moralities, each of which is viewed from 
within by its adherents as morality-as-such, each of which makes its 
exclusive claim to our allegiance. How are we to evaluate such claims? 
One way to begin is to be learned from Aristotle. Since we possess no 
stock of clear and distinct first principles or any other such epistemologi-
cal resource which would provide us with a neutral and independent 
standard for judging between them, we shall do well to proceed 
dialectically. And one useful dialectical strategy is to focus attention on 
those accusations which the adherents of each bring against the rival 
position which the adherents of that rival position treat as of central 
importance to rebut. For this will afford at least one indication of the 
issues about the importance of which both sides agree and about the 
characterisation of which their very recognition of disagreement sug-
gests that there must also be some shared beliefs. In what areas do such 
issues arise? 
IV. 
One such area is defined by a charge which it seems reasonable at 
least pn"ma facie for the protagonists of patriotism to bring against 
morality. The morality for which patriotism is a virtue offers a form of 
rational justification for moral rules and precepts whose structure is 
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clear and rationally defensible. The rules of morality are justifiable if 
and only if they are productive of and partially constitutive of a form of 
shared social life whose goods are directly enjoyed by those inhabiting 
the particular communities whose social life is of that kind. Hence qutJ 
member of this or that particular community I can appreciate the 
justification for what morality requires of me from within the social roles 
that I live out in my community. By contrast, it may be argued, liberal 
morality requires of me to assume an abstract and artificial-perhaps 
even an impossible-stance, that of a rational being as such, responding 
to the requirements of morality not qutJ parent or farmer or quarterback, 
but qutJ rational agent who has abstracted him or herself from all social 
particularity, who has become not merely Adam Smith's impartial 
spectator, but a correspondingly impartial actor, and one who in his 
impartiality is doomed to rootlessness, to be a citizen of nowhere. How 
can I justify to myself performing this act of abstraction and detach-
ment? 
The liberal answer is clear: such abstraction and detachment is 
defensible, because it is a necessary condition of moral freedom, of 
emancipation from the bondage of the social, political and economic 
status quo. For unless I can stand back fr;om every and any feature of that 
status quo, including the roles within it which I myself presently inhabit, I 
will be unable to view it critically and to decide for myself what stance it 
is rational and right for me to adopt towards it. This does not preclude 
that the outcome of such a critical evaluation may not be an endorse-
ment of all or some of the existing social order; but even such an 
endorsement will only be free and rational ifl have made it for myself in 
this way. (Making just such an endorsement of much of the economic 
status quo is the distinguishing mark of the contemporary conservative 
liberal, such as Milton Friedman, who is as much a liberal as the liberal 
liberal who finds much of the status quo wanting-such asj. K. Galbraith 
or Edward Kennedy-or the radical liberal.) Thus liberal morality does 
after all appeal to an overriding good, the good of this particular kind of 
emancipating freedom. And in the name of this good it is able not only 
to respond to the question about how the rules of morality are to be 
justified, but also to frame a plausible and potentially damaging 
objection to the morality of patriotism. 
It is of the essence of the morality ofliberalism that no limitations are 
or can be set upon the criticism of the social status quo. No institution, no 
practice, no loyalty can be immune from being put in question and 
perhaps rejected. Conversely the morality of patriotism is one which 
precisely because it is framed in terms of the membership of some 
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particular social community with some particular social, political and 
economic structure, must exempt at least some fundamental structures 
of that community's life from criticism. Because patriotism has to be a 
loyalty that is in some respects unconditional, so in just those respects 
rational criticism is ruled out. But if so the adherents of the morality of 
patriotism have condemned themselves to a fundamentally irrational 
attitude-since to refuse to examine some of one's fundamental beliefs 
and attitudes is to insist on accepting them, whether they are rationally 
justifiable or not, which is irrational-and have imprisoned themselves 
within that irrationality. What answer can the adherents of the morality 
of patriotism make to this kind of accusation? The reply must be 
threefold. 
When the liberal moralist claims that the patriot is bound to treat his 
or her nation's projects and practices in some measure uncritically, the 
claim is not only that at any one time certain of these projects and 
practices will be being treated uncritically; it is that some at least must 
be permanently exempted from criticism. The patriot is in no position to 
deny this; but what is crucial to the patriot's case is to identify clearly 
precisely what it is that is thus exempted. And at this point it becomes 
extremely important that in outlining the case for the morality of 
patriotism-as indeed in outlining the case for liberal morality-we 
should not be dealing with strawmen. Liberalism and patriotism are not 
positions invented by me or by other external commentators; they have 
their own distinctive spokesmen and their own distinctive voices. And 
although I hope that it has been clear throughout that I have only been 
trying to articulate what those voices would say, it is peculiarly 
important ·to the case for patriotic morality at this point that its actual 
historical protagonists be identified. So what I say next is an attempt to 
identify the common attitudes on this point of Charles Peguy and 
Charles de Gaulle, of Bismarck and of Adam von Trott. You will notice 
that in these pairs one member is someone who was at least for a time a 
member of his nation's political establishment, the other someone who 
was always in a radical way outside that establishment and hostile to it, 
but that even those who were for a time identified with the status quo of 
power, were also at times alienated from it. And this makes it clear that 
whatever is exempted from the patriot's criticism the status quo of power 
and government and the policies pursued by those exercising power and 
government never need be so exempted. What then is exempted? The 
answer is: the nation conceived as a proJect, a project somehow or other 
brought to birth in the past and carried on so that a morally distinctive 
community was brought into being which embodied a claim to political 
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autonomy in its various organized and institutionalised expressions. 
Thus one can be patriotic towards a nation whose political independence 
is yet to come-as Garibaldi was; or towards a nation which once was 
and perhaps might be again-like the Polish patriots of the 1860s. What 
the patriot is committed to is a particular way oflinking a past which has 
conferred a distinctive moral and political identity upon him or her with 
a future for the project which is his or her nation which it is his or her 
responsibility to bring into being. Only this allegiance is unconditional 
and allegiance to particular governments or forms of government or 
particular leaders will be entirely conditional upon their being devoted 
to furthering that project rather than frustrating or destroying it. Hence 
there is nothing inconsistent in a patriot's being deeply opposed to his 
country's contemporary rulers, as Peguy was, or plotting their over-
throw as Adam von Trott did. 
Yet although this may go part of the way towards answering the 
charge of the liberal moralist that the patriot must in certain areas be 
completely uncritical and therefore irrationalist, it certainly does not go 
all the way. For everything that I have said on behalf of the morality of 
patriotism is compatible with it being the case that on occasion 
patriotism might require me to support and work for the success of some 
enterprise of my nation as crucial to its overall project, crucial perhaps 
to its survival, when the success of that enterprise would not be in the 
best interests of mankind, evaluated from an impartial and an imper-
sonal standpoint. The case of Adam von Trott is very much to the point. 
Adam von Trott was a German patriot who was executed after the 
unsuccessful assassination attempt against Hitler's life in 1944. Trott 
deliberately chose to work inside Germany with the minuscule, but 
highly placed, conservative opposition to the Nazis with the aim of 
replacing Hitler from within, rather than to work for an overthrow of 
Nazi Germany which would result in the destruction of the Germany 
brought to birth in 1871. But to do this he had to appear to be identified 
with the cause of Nazi Germany and so strengthened not only his 
country's cause, as was his intention, but also as an unavoidable 
consequence the cause of the Nazis. This kind of example is a 
particularly telling one, because the claim that such and such a course of 
action is "to the best interests of mankind" is usually at best disputable, 
at worst cloudy rhetoric. But there are a very few causes in which so 
much was at stake-and that this is generally much clearer in retrospect 
than it was at the time does not alter that fact-that the phrase has clear 
application: the overthrow of Nazi Germany was one of them. 
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How ought the patriot then to respond? Perhaps in two ways. The 
first begins by reemphasising that from the fact that the particularist 
morality of the patriot is rooted in a particular community and 
inextricably bound up with the social life of that community, it does not 
follow that it cannot provide rational grounds for repudiating many 
features of that country's present organized social life. The conception 
of justice engendered by the notion of citizenship within a particular 
community may provide standards by which particular political institu-
tions are found wanting: when Nazi anti-Semitism encountered the 
phenomena of German Jewish ex-soldiers who had won the Iron Cross, 
it had to repudiate German particularist standards of excellence (for the 
award of the Iron Cross symbolised a recognition of devotion to 
Germany). Moreover the conception of one's own nation having a 
special mission does not necessitate that this mission may not involve the 
extension of a justice originally at home only in the particular institu-
tions of the homeland. And clearly particular governments or agencies 
of government may defect and may be understood to have defected from 
this mission so radically that the patriot may find that a point comes 
when he or she has to choose between the claims of the project which 
constitutes his or her nation and the claims of the morality that he or she 
has learnt as a member of the community whose life is informed by that 
project. Yes, the liberal critic of patriotism will respond, this indeed may 
happen; but it may not and it often will not. Patriotism turns out to be a 
permanent source of moral danger. And this claim, I take it, cannot in 
fact be successfully rebutted. 
A second possible, but very different type of answer on behalf of the 
patriot would run as follows. I argued earlier that the kind of regard for 
one's own country which would be compatible with a liberal morality of 
impersonality and impartiality would be too insubstantial, would be 
under too many constraints, to be regarded as a version of patriotism in 
the traditional sense. But it does not follow that some version of 
traditional patriotism may not be compatible with some other morality 
of universal moral law, which sets limits to and provides both sanction 
for and correction of the particularist morality of the patriot. Whether 
this is so or not is too large and too distinct a question to pursue in this 
present paper. But we ought to note that even if it is so-and all those 
who have been both patriots and Christians or patriots and believers in 
Thomistic natural law or patriots and believers in the Rights of Man 
have been committed to claiming that it is so-this would not diminish 
in any way the force of the liberal claim that patriotism is a morally 
dangerous phenomenon. 
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That the rational protagonist of the morality of patnousm is 
compelled, if my argument is correct, to concede this does not mean that 
there is not more to be said in the debate. And what needs to be said is 
that the liberal morality of impartiality and impersonality turns out also 
to be a morally dangerous phenomenon in an interestingly correspond-
ing way. For suppose the bonds of patriotism to be dissolved: would 
liberal morality be able to provide anything adequately substantial in its 
place? What the morality of patriotism at its best provides is a clear 
account of and justification for the particular bonds and loyalties which 
form so much. of the substance of the moral life. It does so by 
underlining the moral importance of the different members of a group 
acknowledging a shared history. Each one of us to some degree or other 
understands his or her life as an enacted narrative; and because of our 
relationships with others we have to understand ourselves as characters 
in the enacted narratives of other people's lives. Moreover the story of 
each of our lives is characteristically embedded in the story of one or 
more larger units. I understand the story of my life in such a way that it 
is part of the history of my family or of this farm or of this university or 
of this countryside; and I understand the story of the lives of other 
individuals around me as embedded in the same larger stories, so that I 
and they share a common stake in the outcome of that story and in what 
sort of story it both is and is to be: tragic, heroic, comic. 
A central contention of the morality of patriotism is that I will 
obliterate and lose a central dimension of the moral life if I do not 
understand the enacted narrative of my own individual life as embedded 
in the history of my country. For if I do not so understand it I will not 
understand what I owe to others or what others owe to me, for what 
crimes of my nation I am bound to make reparation, for what benefits to 
my nation I am bound to feel gratitude. Understanding what is owed to 
and by me and understanding the history of the communities of which I 
am a part is on this view one and the same thing. 
It is worth stressing that one consequence of this is that patriotism, in 
the sense in which I am understanding it in this paper, is only possible in 
certain types of national community under certain conditions. A 
national community, for example, which systematically disowned its 
own true history or substituted a largely fictitious history for it or a 
national community in which the bonds deriving from history were in 
no way the real bonds of the community (having been replaced for 
example by the bonds of reciprocal self-interest) would be one towards 
which patriotism would be-from any point of view-an irrational 
attitude. For precisely the same reasons that a family whose members all 
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came to regard membership in that family as governed only by 
reciprocal self-interest would no longer be a family in the traditional 
sense, so a nation whose members took up a similar attitude would no 
longer be a nation and this would provide adequate grounds for holding 
that the project which constituted that nation had simply collapsed. 
Since all modern bureaucratic states tend towards reducing national 
communities to this condition, all such states tend towards a condition in 
which any genuine morality of patriotism would have no place and what 
paraded itself as patriotism would be an unjustifiable simulacrum. 
Why would this matter? In modern communities in which member-
ship is understood only or primarily in terms of reciprocal self-interest, 
only two resources arc generally available when destructive conflicts of 
interest threaten such reciprocity. One is the arbitrary imposition of 
some solution by force; the other is appeal to the neutral, impartial and 
impersonal standards of liberal morality. The importance of this 
resource is scarcely to be underrated; but how much of a resource is it? 
The problem is that some motivation has to be provided for allegiance to 
the standards of impartiality and impersonality which both has rational 
justification and can outweigh the considerations provided by interest. 
Since any large need for such allegiance arises precisely and only when 
and insofar as the possibility of appeals to reciprocity in interests has 
broken down, such reciprocity can no longer provide the relevant kind 
of motivation. And it is difficult to identify anything that can take its 
place. The appeal to moral agents qiUl rational beings to place their 
allegiance to impersonal rationality above that to their interests has, just 
because it is an appeal to rationality, to furnish an adequate reason for so 
doing. And this is a point at which liberal accounts of morality arc 
notoriously vulnerable. This vulnerability becomes a manifest practical 
liability at one key point in the social order. 
Every political community except in the most exceptional conditions 
requires standing armed forces for its minimal security. Of the members 
of these armed forces it must require both that they be prepared to 
sacrifice their own lives for the sake of the community's security and that 
their willingness to do so be not contingent upon their own individual 
evaluation of the rightness or wrongness of their country's cause on 
some specific issue, measured by some standard that is neutral and 
impartial relative to the interests of their own community and the 
interests of other communities. And, that is to say, good soldiers may not 
be liberals and must indeed embody in their actions a good deal at least 
of the morality of patriotism. So the political survival of any polity in 
which liberal morality had secured large-scale allegiance would depend 
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upon there still being enough young men and women who rejected that 
liberal morality. And in this sense liberal morality tends towards the 
dissolution of social bonds. 
Hence the charge that the morality of patriotism can successfully 
bring against liberal morality is the mirror-image of that which liberal 
morality can successfully urge against the morality of patriotism. For 
while the liberal moralist was able to conclude that patriotism is a 
permanent source of moral danger because of the way it places our ties 
to our nation beyond rational criticism, the moralist who defends 
patriotism is able to conclude that liberal morality is a permanent source 
of moral danger because of the way it renders our social and moral ties 
too open to dissolution by rational criticism. And each party is in fact in 
the right against the other. 
v. 
The fundamental task which confronts any moral philosopher who 
finds this conclusion compelling is clear. It is to enquire whether, 
although the central claims made on behalf of these two rival modern 
moralities cannot both be true, we ought perhaps not to move towards 
the conclusion that both sets of claims are in fact false. And this is an 
enquiry in which substantial progress has already been made. But 
history in its impatience does not wait for moral philosophers to 
complete their tasks, let alone to convince their fellow-citizens. The polis 
ceased to be the key institution in Greek politics even while Aristotle was 
still restating its rationale and any contemporary philosopher who 
discusses the key conceptions that have informed modern political life 
since the eighteenth century is in danger of reliving Aristotle's fate, even 
if in a rather less impressive way. The owl ofMinerva really does seem to 
fly at dusk. 
Does this mean that my argument is therefore devoid of any 
immediate practical significance? That would be true only if the 
conclusion that a morality of liberal impersonality and a morality of 
patriotism must be deeply incompatible itself had no practical signifi-
cance for our understanding of our everyday politics. But perhaps a 
systematic recognition of this incompatibility will enable us to diagnose 
one central flaw in the political life characteristic of modern Western 
states, or at least of all those modern Western states which look back for 
their legitimation to the American and the French revolutions. For 
polities so established have tended to contrast themselves with the older 
regimes that they displaced by asserting that, while all previous polities 
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had expressed in their lives the partiality and one-sidedness of local 
customs, institutions and traditions, they have for the first time given 
expression in their constitutional and institutional forms to the imper-
sonal and impartial rules of morality as such, common to all rational 
beings. So Robespierre proclaimed that it was an effect of the French 
Revolution that the cause of France and the cause of the Rights of Man 
were one and the same cause. And in the nineteenth century the United 
States produced its own version of this claim, one which at the level of 
rhetoric provided the content for many Fourth of July orations and at 
the level of education set the standards for the Americanisation of the 
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century immigrants, espe-
cially those from Europe. 
Hegel employs a useful distinction which he ma··ks by his use of 
words Sittlichkeit and Moralitiit. Sittlichkeit is the customary morality of 
each particular society, pretending to be no more than this. Moralitiit 
reigns in the realm of rational universal, impersonal morality, of liberal 
morality, as I have defined it. What those immigrants were taught in 
effect was that they had left behind countries and cultures where 
Sittlichkeit and Moralitiit were certainly distinct and often opposed and 
arrived in a country and a culture whose Sittlichkeitjust is Moralitiit. And 
thus for many Americans the cause of America, understood as the object 
of patriotic regard, and the cause of morality, understood as the liberal 
moralist understands it, came to be identified. The history of this 
identification could not be other than a history of confusion and 
incoherence, if the argument which I have constructed in this lecture is 
correct. For a morality of particularist ties and solidarities has been 
conflated with a morality of universal, impersonal and impartial 
principles in a way that can never be carried through without in-
coherence. 
One test therefore of whether the argument that I have constructed 
has or has not empirical application and practical significance would be 
to discover whether it is or is not genuinely illuminating to write the 
political and social history of modern America as in key part the living 
out of a central conceptual confusion, a confusion perhaps required for 
the survival of a large-scale modern polity which has to exhibit itself as 
liberal in many institutional settings, but which also has to be able to 
engage the patriotic regard of enough of its citizens, if it is to continue 
functioning effectively. To determine whether that is or is not true would 
be to risk discovering that we inhabit a kind of polity whose moral order 
requires systematic incoherence in the form of public allegiance to 
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mutually inconsistent sets of principles. But that is a task which-
happily-lies beyond the scope of this lecture. 
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